报告信息：
主 题：Stable matching: An integer programming approach
主讲人：黄超 博士
报告内容摘要：This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious continuum market induced from the original matching market. Each stable integral matching of the continuum market corresponds to a stable matching of the original matching market. We show that a stable matching exists in the original matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Our result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.
主持人：焦振华 教授
时 间：2021年5月14日（星期五）13：30-15:00
地 点：纽约国际588888线路检测中心博识楼113会议室
主讲人简介：
黄超，上海财经大学西方经济学博士，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院润泽学者，主要研究领域为：微观经济理论、市场设计理论、匹配理论；论文发表于Games and Economic Behavior，Social Choice and Welfare等。
This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a real-life market when firms’ preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Contrary to common blief, this result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.